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III.

ARGUMENT

A. The Proper Context of the Case
In multiple sections of their responsive brief, Appellees mischaracterize this case as
merely the efforts of Wadsworth and Reese “to judicially dissociate a third accountant from their
business” (Respondent’s Brief, p. 1) “and resolve Siddoway’s claim that he owned a two-thirds
interest in the company and that Reese owned none.” (Id., p. 2). Additionally, multiple sections
of Appellees’ Brief mischaracterize several aspects of the underlying case, irrelevant to this
appeal. The most troubling example is Appellees implication that Siddoway wrongfully resigned
as a manager of SWR, started a competitive business with Dustin Siddoway, induced employees
to leave SWR, and solicited “hundreds of [SWR] clients” to follow. (Id., p. 1.) (Id., p. 2 -
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Appellees asserts that Siddoway seeks an unjust enrichment award “for the value of clients that
did not follow Siddoway and his nephew to their new business.) (Id., p. 7 – Appellees assert that
Siddoway “walked away and invited all of his client to join him . . . when he left to start a new
business in a new location with his nephew.”).
This incorrect implication was the underlying basis of nearly the entirety of Wadsworth’s
and Reese’s Complaint, and was thoroughly defeated on summary judgment or disproved at trial.
(R., Vol. I, pp. 390-91, ¶¶ 19, 24). Following more than two years of protracted litigation and a
five-day bench trial, the district court held that Siddoway had not breached any fiduciary duty,
did not usurp any benefit belonging to SWR, was not in business with Dustin, did not solicit
hundreds of clients to leave SWR, and was not liable to Wadsworth, Reese, or SWR for any
amount of money. (R., Vol. I, pp. 396-99).
Contrary to the context implied by Appellees’ Brief, this intensively litigated and
multifaceted case included Plaintiffs’/Appellees’ claims for preliminary injunction, dissociation
of Siddoway PC from SWR, breach of fiduciary duty by Siddoway, civil conspiracy to commit
breach of fiduciary duty, violation of the Idaho Trade Secrets Act, interference with prospective
business advantage, civil conspiracy to interfere with prospective economic advantage, breach of
confidence, civil conspiracy to commit breach of confidence, and breach of the Reese
Agreement. (R., Vol. I, pp. 32-55).
After more than two years of litigation and a five-day bench trial, all of
Plaintiffs’/Appellees’ claims were dismissed on summary judgment or defeated at trial, save only
one, the effort to dissociate Siddoway PC. It is important to note that the dissociation of
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Siddoway PC was not due to any “wrongful conduct” or a willful or persistent “material breach
of the operating agreement” (IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-25-602 (6)), but rather merely because “it
was not reasonably practicable to carry on the activities and affairs” of SWR with Siddoway PC
as a full member. (R., Vol. I, p. 394).
Appellant trusts that this Court will view this appeal in its true context and not through
the tainted lens of the untrue and disproven statements in Appellees’ Brief alleging wrongful
conduct by Siddoway.
B. Arbitration Legal Fees and Costs
Appellees’ Brief largely ignores the three primary legal arguments raised by Appellants
regarding the district court’s denial of Siddoway’s multiple requests for attorney fees and costs
related to litigation over the arbitration clause in the Reese Agreement. Specifically, in complex
litigation, 1) at what point is it proper for the trial court to consider such an award, 2) what is the
proper scope of consideration for such an award, and, in this case 3) did the district court lack
jurisdiction, or otherwise err, in hearing Reese’s successive Motion to Stay Arbitration after it
had already granted Appellants’ Motion to Compel Arbitration.
Indeed, it appears that the issue of timing and scope of awards of attorney fees related to
arbitrability litigation, as raised in this case, is a matter of first impression in Idaho.
1. Award is Appropriate Immediately Following an Order to Arbitrate
As argued in Appellants’ Initial Brief, Appellants contend that award of attorney fees and
costs related to the arbitrability proceedings is appropriate at the conclusion of the arbitration
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litigation, even if unrelated claims remain in the underlying district court case. Appellants’
Initial Brief argues that this contention is supported and consistent with Idaho statute, the plain
language of the Reese Agreement, and Idaho Supreme Court precedent.
In response, Appellees’ Brief argues, only, that Appellants’ Initial Brief misapplies this
Court’s holding in Grease Spot, Inc. v. Harnes, 148 Idaho 582, 226 P.3d 524 (2010). Appellee is
incorrect.
Appellant recognizes that Grease Spot is different than the instant case in that Grease
Spot did not include claims outside the contract at issue, as this case does. However, this
distinction does not render Appellants’ arguments incorrect. To the contrary, in Grease Monkey
this Court held that it “became apparent that the [defendants] were the ‘prevailing party’ for
purposes of receiving attorney fees once they prevailed in compelling arbitration, thereby
terminating consideration of the merits of the action.” Grease Spot, Inc., 148 Idaho 582, 586
(2010) (emphasis added). This holding is consistent with the well-established legal principle that
when a party raises an objection to an arbitration clause, the court’s “inquiry must be limited in
scope” addressing only the question, “is there an agreement to arbitrate or is there not.” Loomis,
Inc. Cudahy, 104 Idaho 106, 109, 656 P.2d 1359, 1362 (1982). Additionally, in Grease Spot
this Court held it proper to limit the scope of the award of attorney fees to those “attributed to
compelling arbitration.” Id.
Because a district court’s jurisdiction in arbitrability disputes is strictly limited in scope,
and because the resulting award of attorney’s fees is also limited in scope, it naturally follows
that the “prevailing party” analysis for such awards must also be limited in scope to the
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arbitrability proceeding. To conclude otherwise would be inconsistent and require the district
court to co-mingle the arbitrability proceeding with causes of action clearly beyond the limited
scope of the arbitrability proceeding.
It must be remembered that Reese should never have included the Reese Agreement
dispute in the district court action. The Reese Agreement dispute was subject to an unambiguous
arbitration clause. Reese improperly included the Reese Agreement dispute in Plaintiffs initial
Complaint, along with a myriad of unrelated claims, and then attempted to avoid arbitration by
filing multiple motions opposing arbitration, all of which failed.
Consistent with Idaho statue, the plain language of the Reese Agreement, and Idaho
Supreme Court precedent, it is proper for a court to award attorney’s fees and costs immediately
following granting or denying a motion regarding arbitrability. Prevailing party analysis, in such
cases, is limited to the arbitrability proceedings only. Siddoway succeeded in compelling
arbitration of the Reese Agreement in not one, but two protracted proceedings. Accordingly,
Siddoway is entitled to an award of legal fees for successfully compelling arbitration of the
Reese Agreement.
2. Reese’s Improper Motion to Stay Arbitration
Appellees’ Brief contains no direct rebuttal to Appellants’ objection to the proceedings
related to Reese’s successive Motion to Stay Arbitration which was filed after the district court
had already granted Appellants’ Motion to Compel Arbitration. Suffice it to say that, as detailed
in Appellants’ Initial Brief, the district court erred in requiring further arbitrability proceedings
after issuing the First Arbitration Order.
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C. Use of SWR Funds to Pay Reese’s Separate Expenses
Appellants’ Initial Brief argues that the district court erred by holding that payment of
Reese’s substantial and separate attorney fees related to the litigation and arbitration of the Reese
Agreement was a legitimate business expense of SWR. The primary justification provided by
the district court for so ruling was that, at trial, Reese testified that in October 2015 he and
Wadsworth voted to have SWR pay Reese’s separate legal fees because of Siddoway’s “previous
claims that he felt like that he was a two-thirds owner” of SWR. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 129 L. 7-9). At
trial Wadsworth testified that in October 2015 he and Reese voted to have SWR pay Reese’s
separate attorney fees to determine “whether or not Clark Reese had membership in [SWR].”
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 776:1-7)
Appellants’ Initial Brief argues that the weight of the evidence supports a finding that no
such vote occurred and that, even if it had occurred, it would not justify payment of tens of
thousands of SWR dollars (to which Siddoway had a 1/3 undivided interest as a member of
SWR) to pay for a legal dispute in which SWR was not a party.
Appellees’ Brief asserts that the evidence is sufficient to support the district court’s
finding and that use of SWR funds to pay Reese’s separate legal fees is appropriate under Idaho
law. Appellees’ assertions and the holdings of the district court, in this regard, are incorrect as
established below.
1. Appellees and the District Court Misconstrue Siddoway’s Testimony.
Appellees and the district court reference Siddoway’s trial testimony and assert that
Siddoway “was claiming he owned two-thirds of [SWR]” in October 2015. (Appellees’ Brief, p.
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12). However, the cited testimony is taken out of context, and is mis-construed. Siddoway’s
cited testimony was related to the events surrounding the signing of the Reese Agreement in
January 2015, long before the partnership broke down and litigation ensued. Siddoway testified
that, in January 2015, if Reese refused to sign the Reese Agreement Siddoway’s position was
that “I would get back that interest.” (Tr. Vol. I, p. 356 L. 11-12). Of course, Reese did sign the
Reese Agreement and began making payments to Siddoway and, therefore, Siddoway never
demanded that Reese transfer back to him Reese’s 1/3 membership interest in SWR. (Tr. Vol. I,
p. 175, L. 6-23).
2. Neither Siddoway’s nor Reese’s Membership Were Contested.
After the Reese Agreement was signed by Reese, Siddoway never claimed to be a defacto
2/3 owner of SWR and Siddoway consistently recognized Reese PC as a 1/3 member of SWR.
Moreover, a dispute over who owned what percentage of SWR was never raised as an issue in
this case until Wadsworth and Reese testified at trial, as the following timeline and evidence
establish:
1) January 28, 2015 – Reese signs the Reese Agreement and commences making payments
to Siddoway. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 175, L. 6-23).
2) August 2015 – Reese stops making payments to Siddoway under the Reese Agreement.
3) October 5, 2015 - Alleged vote by Wadsworth and Reese to have SWR pay Reese’s
separate legal fees because Siddoway “was claiming he owned two-thirds of [SWR].”
(Appellees’ Brief, p. 12).
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a) It is important to note that the only physical evidence presented to support the
alleged vote is Exhibit 74, which does not mention Siddoway’s alleged claim of
2/3 ownership. Rather, it evidences a self-dealing transaction between Reese
and Wadsworth. (See Appellants’ Initial Brief, p. 23-25).
4) December 12, 2016 – Appellees file their initial Complaint, which contains no mention
or request for relief related to the alleged claim by Siddoway that he owns 2/3 of SWR.
(R. Vol I. p. 32-55).
5) January 19, 2016 – Siddoway files an Answer to the Complaint and a Counterclaim.
Siddoway’s Counterclaim does not assert that he owns 2/3 of SWR. To the contrary,
paragraphs 2, 4, and 6 of Siddoway’s Counterclaim state that Siddoway PC, Wadsworth
PC, and Reese PC are each members of SWR. Specifically, Paragraph 6 of the
Siddoway’s Counterclaim acknowledges that “Reese PC is an Idaho professional
corporation in good standing with the Idaho Secretary of State and a member of
[SWR].” (R. Vol. I, p. 79, ¶ 6) (emphasis added).
6) March 7, 2016 – Wadsworth and Reese file an Answer to Siddoway’s Counterclaim
expressly admitting to paragraphs 2, 4, and 6 and, thus, acknowledging that Siddoway
PC, Wadsworth PC, and Reese PC are each members of SWR. (R. Vol. I, p. 137-38,
¶¶ 2, 4, 6).
7) May 24, 2016 – Wadsworth and Reese file an Amended Complaint containing no
mention or request for relief related to the alleged claim by Siddoway that he owns 2/3
of SWR. (R. Vol. I, p. 161-80).
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8) June 20, 2016 – Siddoway files an Answer and Amended Counterclaim in response to
Appellees’ Amended Complaint. Again, Siddoway does not assert that he owns 2/3 of
SWR. To the contrary, paragraphs 2, 4, and 6 of Siddoway’s Amended Counterclaim
acknowledge that Siddoway PC, Wadsworth PC, and Reese PC are each members of
SWR. (R. Vol. I, p. 197-198, ¶¶ 2, 4, and 6).
9) October 19, 2016 – Siddoway files a Motion for Preliminary Injunction with supporting
memorandum and affidavit, seeking to enjoin Wadsworth and Reese from using SWR
funds to pay Reese’s separate legal fees. The memorandum and affidavit each include a
statement by Siddoway that Siddoway PC, Reese PC, and Wadsworth PC “each hold a
1/3 membership interest in SWR.”
10) November 22, 2016 – Oral argument on Siddoway’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction
is held. The district court held that, at oral argument, Wadsworth and Reese “did not
identify a sound justification – a legitimate business reason – for [SWR] to cover
Reese’s legal expenses in connection with litigation and arbitration of claims involving
the Reese Agreement.” (R. Vol. I, p. 263).
11) December 30, 2016 – The district court issues its Order stating that “Siddoway has
shown that [SWR] has been paying to litigate and arbitrate claims and issues to which it
isn’t a party, benefiting Reese but harming Siddoway.” (R., Vol. I, p. 263).
Accordingly, the district court enjoins Wadsworth and Reese by ordering that “unless
and until Plaintiffs demonstrate that [SWR] has a legitimate business reason for
covering Reese’s legal expenses with respect to claims and issues relating to the Reese
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Agreement . . . [SWR] is enjoined from doing so and Reese PC and Wadsworth PC are
enjoined from causing [SWR] to do so.” (R. Vol. 1, p. 263). While this order was
favorable to Siddoway, it essentially invited and enticed Wadsworth and Reese to come
up with some reason, any reason, to justify use of SWR funds to pay tens of thousands
of dollars of Reese’s separate legal fees.
12) January 1, 2017 – (Two days after issuance of the injunction) Wadsworth and Reese
vote to increase their management salaries by $4,000 per month, over the objection of
Siddoway. (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 888:13 – 891:4)
13) March 20, 2017 – With the permission of the district court, Siddoway files his second
Amended Counterclaim. Again, Siddoway does not assert that he owns 2/3 of SWR. To
the contrary, paragraphs 3, 5, and 7 of Siddoway’s second Amended Counterclaim
acknowledge that Siddoway PC, Wadsworth PC, and Reese PC are each members of
SWR. (R., Vol. I, pg 274).
14) April 10, 2017 – Wadsworth and Reese file an Answer to Siddoway’s second Amended
Counterclaim expressly admitting to paragraphs 3, 5, and 7, acknowledging that
Siddoway PC, Wadsworth PC, and Reese PC are each members of SWR. (R. Vol. I, p.
303, ¶¶ 3, 5, 7).
15) November 7, 2017 – Reese testifies at trial, under oath, that Siddoway was claiming he
owned 2/3 of SWR in October 2015 and thereafter. Therefore, testified Reese, he and
Wadsworth voted to have SWR pay all of Reese’s litigation and arbitration attorney fees
related to the Reese Agreement. (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 128:4-129:12).
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16) November 13, 2017 – Wadsworth testifies, under oath, that in October 2015 he and
Reese voted to have SWR pay Reese’s separate attorney fees to determine “whether or
not Clark Reese had membership in [SWR].” (Tr. Vol. I, p. 776:1-7).
The pleadings, trial testimony, and other circumstantial evidence, clearly and
convincingly establish that Wadsworth and Reese did not vote as they testified, but rather,
concocted their “2/3 Ownership Argument” long after October 2015, and likely in response to
the district court’s injunction order, all in an attempt to mask their blatant misappropriation of
SWR funds. Indeed, from August 2015 until the date the trial began, neither Siddoway, Reese,
nor Wadsworth contested the identity or ownership percentages of the members of SWR.
In holding otherwise, the district court committed clear error.
3. Even if True, Appellees’ Theory Does Not Justify use of SWR Funds to Pay
Reese’s Separate Expenses.
Even if Reese’s and Wadsworth’s assertions were true, it would not justify the use of tens
of thousands of dollars of SWR funds to pay Reese’s separate legal fees. Neither the district
court nor Appellees identify any statute, case law, or legal principle that would justify use of
SWR funds to pay for Reese’s personal expenses related to a dispute over a contract to which
SWR was not a party. To the contrary, Idaho case law prohibits such action.
This Court has long recognized that majority shareholders can, and often do, apply
numerous means to improperly benefit themselves at the expense of minority shareholders.
Holders of a majority of the voting shares in a corporation, through their ability to
elect and control a majority of the directors and to determine the outcome of
shareholders’ votes on other matters, have tremendous power to use a great variety
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of devices or modes of operation to benefit themselves at the expense of minority
shareholders. Here are a few illustrations. The squeezers may cut off the flow of
income to the minority by refusing to declare dividends or they may deprive
minority shareholders of corporate offices and of employment by the company. At
the same time, the squeezers can protect their own income stream from the
business by exorbitant salaries and bonuses to the majority shareholderofficers and perhaps to their relatives, by high rental payments for property the
corporation leases from majority shareholders, or by unreasonable payments
under contracts between the corporation and majority shareholders.
McCann v. McCann, 152 Idaho 809, 816, 275 P.3d 824, 831 (2012) (emphasis
added).
In McCann, this Court observed that “courts have analyzed alleged ‘oppressive’ conduct
by those in control in terms of ‘fiduciary duties’ owed by the majority shareholders to the
minority.” Id. at 815. “Typically, relief has been granted in non-fraud oppression cases where
the majority has engaged in [oppressive] conduct.” Id. at 816.
In McCann, the majority shareholders authorized corporate funds “directly to pay [a
majority shareholder’s personal] expenses.” Id. at 832. This Court recognized that payment of a
majority shareholder’s personal expenses has “an effect on [minority shareholders] above and
beyond the effect on every other shareholder. Each of these transactions hurts [the minority
shareholder] specifically.” Id. In McCann, this Court observed that because the majority
shareholders “did not use an alternate and less harmful means of providing for [the majority
shareholder], it may be argued that the transactions were not made in good faith.” Id. For
example, the company “could have issued a dividend that would benefit all shareholders.” Id.
Because the company did not issue the dividend, the minority shareholder “received no
meaningful benefit.” Id.
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The district court’s holding that it was proper for Wadsworth and Reese to use SWR
funds to pay Reese’s personal expenses is based on insufficient and misconstrued evidence.
Even if Appellees’ asserted reasoning for making the payments were true, such payments are
contrary to Idaho law because, as in McCann, such payments specifically harm the minority
member Siddoway. In fact, in this case the use of SWR funds to pay Reese’s separate legal fees
constitutes a multiplied harm to Siddoway, adding insult to injury. In effect, Wadsworth and
Reese used Siddoway’s share of SWR assets to finance Reese’s litigation against Siddoway.
Having done so constitutes a violation of Wadsworth’s and Reese’s duty of care, loyalty, and
their duty to “exercise the utmost good faith in managing the [company].” Id. at 830.
D. Derivative v. Direct Actions
Appellees adopt the district courts holding that “neither term [direct or derivative]
encompasses an action a limited liability company pursues in its own right.” (Aug. R. p. 5). The
district Court’s holding is incorrect for at least three reasons. First, the district court’s analysis is
too narrow in scope and misconstrues Idaho statute. Second, the district court’s analysis implies
that Appellees’ Complaint is a direct action, ignoring the fact that Appellees invoked Idaho’s
derivative action statues in their Complaint, First Amended Complaint, and Second Amended
Complaint. Third, if the underlying litigation, initiated by Appellees, is not derivative or direct,
what is it?
Idaho statutes provides that “a member may maintain a direct action against another
member, a manager, or the limited liability company to enforce the member's rights.” IDAHO
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CODE ANN. § 30-25-801. The district court, apparently, reads this statute as limiting “direct
actions” solely to those brought by members of a LLC to enforce that member’s rights.
This interpretation is too narrow and misconstrues the relevant statutes.
The derivative action statute, invoked by Appellees on three separate occasions, states
that a “member may maintain a derivative action to enforce a right of a limited liability
company.” IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-25-802.
Taken together, the context and plain language of the two statutes establish that a
member can bring a “direct action” to enforce the member’s rights. It naturally follows that, if a
member can bring a “direct action” to enforce a member’s rights, an LLC can bring a “direct
action” to enforce a right of the LLC. However, the rights of an LLC can be enforced in an
alternative fashion. A member, under certain circumstances, can enforce a LLC right
derivatively (i.e. in lieu of a direct action by the LLC).
This action is a derivative action as evidenced by Appellees’ invocation of Idaho’s
derivative action statutes. Even if the action is a direct action of SWR, it does not justify use of
SWR funds to pay the separate legal expenses of the other Plaintiffs and Counterclaim
Defendants. As established in Section V. above, such payments benefit Wadsworth and Reese
only and constitute a specific harm to Siddoway.
In effect, Wadsworth and Reese used Siddoway’s share of SWR assets to finance their
protracted litigation against Siddoway and the other Defendants. To add insult to injury, after
more than two years of litigation and a five-day bench trial, and expenditure of approximately
$300,000 of SWR funds, Wadsworth and Reese recovered nothing for themselves or the
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company. Having done so constitutes a violation of Wadsworth’s and Reese’s duty of care,
loyalty, and their duty to “exercise the utmost good faith in managing the [company].” McCann,
at 815.
E. Siddoway’s Unjust Enrichment Claim
Appellees contend that Siddoway should receive nothing from Reese in unjust
enrichment for the following reason:
1) Siddoway conveyed no benefit on Reese.
2) The voiding of the Reese Agreement should be viewed as having placed the parties “back
in the position they were in as if [the Reese Agreement] had never been signed.”
(Respondents’ Brief, p. 18.)
3) Siddoway didn’t contribute as much to SWR as Reese.
Appellees arguments are insufficient to justify denial of recovery for Siddoway in unjust
enrichment and, in many respects, supports a substantial recovery for Siddoway.
1. The Benefit Conveyed on Reese is Undeniable and Substantial.
Appellees assert that the district court erred in holding that “Reese PC undeniably
benefited to some degree” from the actions of Siddoway. (R., Vol. I, p. 401, ¶ 19). Not only is
Reese’s assertion incorrect, it is improperly inserted into this appeal because Appellees filed no
appeal on that issue.
Be that as it may, Appellees’ assertion provides an opportunity to, once again, detail the
undeniable and substantial benefit conferred on Reese by Siddoway:
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1) Prior to January 2014, Reese had never been a partner in an accounting firm and was an
employee of Siddoway PC. (R., Vol. I, p. 385 ¶ 2).
2) In November 2013, Siddoway and Reese began discussing becoming partners or
co-owners of an accounting firm, on terms that involved Reese buying a one-half interest
in Siddoway’s practice, as Siddoway had spent 20-plus years establishing a client base
but Reese had not. R., Vol. I, p. 386, ¶ 4.
3) Siddoway and Reese agreed on a formula to determine an amount Reese would pay
Siddoway to become his equal partner, which included taking the prior year’s annual
collections of Siddoway PC, multiplying that number by a factor of .80, and then splitting
the number in half. (Tr. 136:21-140:13).
4) The formula resulted in an amount Reese would pay Siddoway of approximately
$200,000.00. (Tr. 145:1-12).
5) SWR was organized on December 20, 2013 and business operations commenced on
January 1, 2014.
6) Reese was recognized by Siddoway, and prompted by Siddoway, as an equal
partner/member with Siddoway from the moment SWR was organized in December
2013, and at all times thereafter. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 146:15 – 146:20) (Tr. Vol. I, p. 154:15155:17).
7) When SWR commenced business operations in January 2014, Reese brought only 7 or 8
clients to SWR. (R., Vol. I, p. 386, ¶ 7).
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8) Siddoway, by contrast, brought hundreds of clients into SWR, numbering around 450,
that Siddoway had developed in his 20-plus years of prior practice. (Id. at ¶ 8).
9) Siddoway was instrumental in SWR purchasing the Harding client base. SWR had this
opportunity because of the past relationship between Siddoway and Harding. (Id. at ¶ 6)
10) Siddoway recommended and introduced Reese to many of the Siddoway PC clients and
many of the largest Harding clients, thus giving Reese the opportunity to service many of
them as well as the opportunity to benefit from the resulting revenue to SWR. (Id. at ¶
8).
11) Nevertheless, in approximately May 2014, Reese contended that there was no agreement
between himself and Siddoway because he and Siddoway had not completed
negotiations. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 168:16-170:6).
12) Siddoway and Reese, with the assistance of Wadsworth, discussed Reese’s disavowment
of the prior agreement for several months.
13) Ultimately, on January 28, 2015, the parties signed the Reese Agreement, which
included an effective date of January 1, 2014, the date SWR commenced business
operations. (Ex. 14, Vol. I, p. 73-77).
14) On January 28, 2015, Reese also signed the associated Promissory Note, promising to
pay Siddoway $200,000, which included an amortization schedule also reflecting an
effective date of January 1, 2014, the date SWR commenced business operations. (Ex.
14, Vol. I, p. 78-79) (Ex. 14, Vol. I, p. 238) (emphasis added).

18

15) The Reese Agreement provides that Reese PC must pay Siddoway PC $200,000 for the
right to receive a one-third membership interest in SWR. (R., Vol. I, p. 373) (Ex. 14,
Vol. I, p. 73).
16) From December 20, 2013 forward, Reese has been, and remains a member of SWR, with
all of the rights appurtenant to such membership, including management rights, rights to
distributions, and employment by SWR.
It is undeniable that Siddoway conveyed upon Reese a very valuable benefit by
transitioning the Siddoway PC clients and practice into SWR, leveraging his prior relationship
with Harding for the benefit of SWR, allowing Reese to be Siddoway’s equal partner, and
introducing and prompting Reese to hundreds of clients. It is similarly undeniable that Siddoway
was induced to do so by Reese’s promise to pay him approximately $200,000, which Reese later
disavowed and then, through this litigation, sought to pay Siddoway nothing.
2. The Voiding of the Reese Agreement Supports Siddoway’s Unjust Enrichment
Claim.
Appellees’ Brief correctly states that once the Reese Agreement was deemed void in
arbitration, the parties should “be put back in the position they were in as if it had never been
signed. (Respondents’ Brief, p. 18). However, Appellees incorrectly represent to the Court that
this date is January 28, 2015 (more than a year after SWR was organized). Appellees fail to
mention that, although the Reese Agreement was executed on January 28, 2015, it is effective as
of January 1, 2014 by the express agreement of the parties. Which, of course, is the date SWR
began business operations. Moreover, the express language of ¶ 8 of the Reese Agreement
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unambiguously states the relationship of the parties and the primary purpose of the Reese
Agreement effective as of January 1, 2014:
8. RELATIONSHIP OF THE PARTIES. Relationship between the parties is that
of Sellers and Buyer. The parties are not partners or joint ventures, nor is there any
other type of relationship. This agreement is intended to create such a
relationship since the seller and buyer will both become owners and members
of Siddoway, Wadsworth & Reese, PLLC [SWR].
(Ex. 14, Vol. I, p. 233, ¶ 8) (emphasis added)
Ironically, and quite tragically, it is Reese’s continued denials and double-speak,
regarding how he acquired his equal partnership in SWR, that led to the deterioration of the
relationship between Wadsworth, Reese, and Siddoway. Over time the distrust between the
parties grew leading Siddoway to seek buyout of his membership interest in SWR and, when that
failed, to resign as a manager. Later, when Dustin, of his own accord, left SWR to start his own
CPA firm, taking with him other employees and clients of SWR, Wadsworth and Reese blamed
Siddoway. Wadsworth and Reese then sued Siddoway and others, using SWR funds to pay for
virtually all of the litigation and arbitration costs because, in Reese’s words “I felt like what he
was doing was unethical and not right, and we wanted him – basically, we wanted him
dissociated. That was the reason.” (Tr., Vol. I, p. 177:4-7).
Despite Appellees’ multiple statements to the contrary, following more than two years of
protracted litigation and a five-day bench trial, the district court held that Siddoway had not
breached any fiduciary duty, did not usurp any benefit belonging to SWR, was not in business
with Dustin, did not solicit hundreds of clients to leave SWR, and was not liable to Wadsworth,
Reese, or SWR for any amount of money. (R., Vol. I, pp. 396-99).
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A benefit was conferred on Reese by Siddoway. Reese enjoys the benefit to this day and
will continue to enjoy the benefit into the foreseeable future. Under the circumstances, it would
be unjust for Siddoway to be denied recovery of the value of the benefit. In denying Siddoway
such recovery, the district court has committed reversible error.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Siddoway is entitled to an award in the amount of his attorney fees and costs related to
successfully compelling arbitration of the Reese Agreement. It was improper for Wadsworth and
Reese to cause SWR to pay virtually all of the litigation costs in this matter, including Reese’s
separate legal expenses. Improper use of SWR funds constitutes defacto disproportionate
distributions in favor of Reese and Wadsworth and is a breach of their utmost fiduciary duties
owed to Siddoway. Reese has been unjustly enriched by Siddoway and, therefore, Siddoway is
entitled to a judgment against Reese. Siddoway is entitle to, and requests, an award of attorney’s
fees and costs as mandated by the Reese Agreement and Idaho statute. Accordingly, Appellant
respectfully requests that this Court take appropriate action to remedy the errors of the district
court in this matter.
Respectfully submitted this 12th day of February, 2019.
/s/Brett W. Hastings_______________
Brett W. Hastings
HASTINGS LAW GROUP, LLC
Attorney for Appellants
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